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INTRODUCTION

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA) is one of many federal statutes with fee-shifting provisions.' Such provisions have been included in Congressional enactments to encourage the participation of private citizens in the
enforcement of these statutes. However, it is necessary to be familiar
with the way in which the fee-shifting provisions of these statutes
have been applied by the courts and administrative law judges in
order to predict when and what compensation will be awarded. The
purpose of this note is to explore the current state of the law in
this area and to suggest the direction it may be taking so that attorneys can determine with some certainty their eligibility for compensation. In addition, the method by which courts determine the
amount of the compensation will be discussed.

1. 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1983).
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II. BACKGROUND
The American Rule for the payment of attorney's fees provides
that each party to a lawsuit pays his or her own attorney's fees.
This rule was formally adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Arcambel v. Wiseman2 wherein the court refused to award attorney's
fees to a prevailing party stating that this was not the practice in
3
the United States.
The American Rule was further entrenched in the legal practices
of the United States by the Fee Act of February 26, 18534 which
listed the costs which might be charged against the non-prevailing
party in a lawsuit and specifically excluded from those costs the
charges between "solicitor and client." 5
However, in the years since Arcambel, certain well-delineated
common-law exceptions to the American Rule have developed. These
exceptions allow for the shifting of attorney's fees from the party
6
incurring the fees to other parties affected by the litigation.
The earliest of these exceptions was developed by the U. S. Supreme Court in Trustees v. Greenough,7 and is called the "common
fund" exception. 8 In exercising the traditional equitable powers of
the judiciary, the Greenough Court shifted some of the prevailing
party's attorney's fees to other shareholders in a trust fund which
was rescued from improper use by the plaintiff's suit. 9 The Court
used the unjust enrichment of the other beneficiaries of the fund
to justify the fee-shifting, reasoning that the other beneficiaries gained
the proper administration of the trust through the plaintiff's suit
without bearing any of the expense of the litigation. 10

2. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 306 (1796).
3. Id. at 306.
4. Fee Act of February 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (1853).
5. Id. at 161.
6. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (for
more extensive background information on the American Rule than contained in this Note).
7. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
8. Id. at 532.
9. Id. at 537.
10. Id.
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The U. S. Supreme Court elaborated on the common fund doctrine in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank" where the beneficiary of a
trust, in pursuing her own claims, vindicated claims of beneficiaries
of separate, but similarly situated trusts.' 2 In Sprague, the Court
found permissible the award of attorney's fees against an ascertainable group who benefited from, but did not participate in the
lawsuit. 3 This group obtained a common benefit even though not
holding an interest in the same trust fund as the plaintiff did.14 Thus,
a "common benefit" exception was added to the "common fund"
exception established in Greenough. Authority for the action was
based on the "historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts." 15
fees was
The Court indicated, however, that the award of attorney's
' 6
justice.'
of
reasons
"dominating
for
only
appropriate
The "common benefit" exception established in Sprague was
given further definition by the U. S. Supreme Court in Mills v.
ElectricAuto-Lite Co.' 7 In Mills, the successful prosecution of a suit
by one stockholder conferred a substantial benefit on other stockholders.' 8 The Court held it within the jurisdiction of the courts to
spread the costs of the litigation proportionately among the beneficiaries even though the common benefit was not monetary.' 9
However, in Boeing Co. v. VanGemert,20 the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated the outer limits of the "common fund/common benefit"
exception. In Boeing a holder of unredeemed convertible debentures
brought a class action suit which resulted in the creation of a fund
from which all class members could receive recompense for their
debentures. 2' The Court ruled that attorney's fees incurred by the
representatives of the class should be assessed against the entire fund
11. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
12. Id. at 166.

13. Id.at 167.
14. Id. at 166.

15. Id.at 164.
16. Id.at 167.
17. 396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).

18. Id. at 393.
19. Id.at 395.
20. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
21. Id. at 480-81.
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so that the cost of the litigation would fall on each member of the
class in exact proportion to their share of the fund.22 However, the
Court cautioned that class action suits would not entitle the class
representatives to reimbursement for attorney's fees from the class
under the "common fund/common benefit" exception unless each
specifically discernible member of the class obtained a precisely as23
certainable benefit.
In addition to the "common fund/common benefit" line of exceptions, the U. S. Supreme Court has developed a second strain
of exceptions to the American Rule that each party to a lawsuit pay
his own attorney's fees. This second exception is predicated on the
judiciary's power to sanction bad faith behavior and is codified in
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24 which provides
for sanctions against attorneys filing frivolous suits. The possible
sanctions include shifting to the offending party the attorney's fees
incurred by others as the result of a frivolous filing of a suit. 25
In addition, bad faith behavior directed at the plaintiff rather
than the court may be sanctioned by shifting attorney's fees. This
occurred in Vaughan v. Atkinson 26 where a seaman was trying to
obtain recuperative pay from his employer. 27 In Vaughan, the U.
S. Supreme Court declared that the plaintiff's attorney's fees could
be assessed against the defendant as part of damages when the losing
party's vexious behavior forced the plaintiff to hire an attorney to
vindicate the plaintiff's rights.Y
Another instance of the imposition of sanctions by a court for
bad faith behavior occurred in Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale
Co. 29 where the losing party attempted to circumvent an adverse
court decision by filing an action to block enforcement of the adverse decision in a court in another jurisdiction.3 0 In Toledo, the U.
22. Id. at 479.
23. Id.
24. FED. R. Crv. P.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

11.

Id.
369 U.S. 527 (1962).
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 530-31.
261 U.S. 399 (1923).
Id. at 401.
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S. Supreme Court ruled that it was not abuse of discretion for the
lower court to hold the offending party liable for the attorney's fees
necessarily incurred by the prevailing party in enforcing the decision. 3'
Thus, there were two strains of common-law developed exceptions to the American Rule, one predicated on the equitable power
of the courts and one based on the power of the courts to control
their own proceedings. Besides the common law exceptions to the
American Rule, attorney's fees may be allocated by contract in which
the parties specify who will pay the expenses of litigating disputes
32
involving the contract.
In addition to the common-law created "common fund/common
benefit" and bad faith exceptions to the American Rule, the courts
attempted to create another exception based on the "private attorney
general" concept. 33 This concept involved the shifting of the attorney's fees of private citizens who help enforce public policy through
private litigation. 34 The use of this judicially created "private attorney general" exception was foreclosed by the U. S. Supreme Court
35
in Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness Society.
Alyeska involved a suit by environmental groups to block issuance of the permits necessary for construction of the trans-Alaska
pipeline.3 6 Attorney's fees were awarded to the environmental groups
by a lower court on the "private attorney general" theory, and
37
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. appealed.
The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's award of
attorney's fees stating that the determination of when fee-shifting
should occur to encourage private enforcement of public policy was
38
for the legislature and not the judiciary to decide.
31. Id. at 428.
32. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 164 (1964 and Supp. 1988).
33. See generally Alyeska, 421 U. S. at 240 (discussing the development of the "private attorney

general" theory).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 269.

36. Id. at 241.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 269.
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In Alyeska, the Court reasoned that since federal law created a
statutory bar to the award of attorney's fees against the United
States and since the theory behind the "private attorney general"
concept was to enlist the aid of private citizens in ensuring the enforcement of laws by public officials, a waiver of government immunity would be necessary in cases where the government, as
defendant, became liable for plaintiff's fees. 9 Furthermore, it was
logical to accomplish the waiver and the authorization in one step
through Congressional enactment.
III.

STATUTORY FEE-SHTNG

In 1975, when Alyeska was decided, Congress had provided for
fee shifting in twenty-eight statutes. 40 By 1985, the number of sta4
tutes providing forfee shifting had burgeoned to over two hundred. '
Among the two hundred statutes was the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 42 The SMCRA was enacted
in response to the environmental problems created by surface coal
mining. 43 National regulation was necessary because the states were
reluctant to disadvantage their respective coal industries by imposing
the regulations necessary for effective control of pollution and because many of the environmental problems created by surface mining
spanned state boundaries. 44
Congressman Morris Udall, the driving force behind passage of
the SMCRA, noted that it was written to encourage full citizen participation in enforcement. 45 To encourage this participation, the authors of the SMCRA included four fee-shifting provisions. These
provisions are contained in sections 703(c), 4 520(f), 4 7 520(d), 48 and
525(e).'
39. Id. at 267-68.
40. Id. at 260 n.3.
41. J. Goodstein, Attorney's Fees: Winning a Recovery in Federal Court (1985).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1982).
43. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in
Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553 (1979).
44. Id. at 553-54.
45. Id. at 557.
46. 30 U.S.C. § 1293(c) (1982).
47. Id. § 1270(f).
48. Id. § 1270(d).
49. Id. § 1275(e).
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The purpose of Section 703(c) is to protect from retaliatory firing
those who report infractions of the SMCRA.5 0 This provision is an
outgrowth of In re Quarles"'in which the U.S. Supreme Court made
clear that it is the duty of the government to assure that citizens
may freely exercise the right to report violations of the law.5 2 It is
essential that this right be protected from coercion if the government
is to obtain the cooperation of the people in the enforcement of the
laws.5 3 Under section 703(c), an employer dismissing an employee
for informing the government of a violation of SMCRA, must pay
the attorney's fees incurred by the employee in proving such retal5
iatory action.5 4 The fees would be assessed as part of damages
While encouraging citizen participation in enforcement underlies all
the fee-shifting provisions of SMCRA, the historical development
of Section 703(c) differs from that of the other fee-shifting provisions and is outside the scope of this note.
In addition, Section 520(f) of the SMCRA is outside the scope
of this note. Briefly, it provides for the payment of the attorney's
fees as a part of damages when a party proves injury through a
violation of SMCRA.5 6 Its focus is the recompense of an injured
plaintiff rather than the fostering of watchdog activities by private
citizens.
It is the fee-shifting provisions of SMCRA which encourage
watchdog activities by private citizens which are the focus of this
note. These sections are Sections 520(d) and 525(e). Section 520(d)
states: "In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court may
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) whenever it determines that such award is appropriate. ' 57 This section, by its plain language covers judicial proceed-

50. Id. § 1293(c).
51. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).

52. Id. at 536.
53. Id.
54. 30 U.S.C. § 1293(c).
55. Id.

56. Id. § 1270(0.
57. Id. § 1270(d).
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ings, and by judicial decision covers the monitoring of judicial orders
such as consent decrees. 8
Section 525(e), which also provides for fee shifting, states:
Whenever an order is issued under this section, or as a result of an administrative
proceeding under this chapter, at the request of any person, a sum equal to the
aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) as determined by the Secretary to have been reasonably incurred by such person for or

in connection with his participation in such proceedings, including any judicial
review of agency actions, may be assessed against either party as the court, resulting from judicial review or the Secretary, resulting from administrative pro59
ceedings, deems proper.

Section 525(e) covers administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings resulting from the administrative actions.
The legislative history of these sections indicates that their purpose is to encourage private litigation to insure enforcement of provisions of SMCRA. 60 Further, these fee-shifting provisions are to be
interpreted consistent with similar federal statutes providing for feeshifting. 61 This congressional intent is important as it allows reference to the entire body of law that has developed around statutory
fee-shifting provisions intended to encourage citizen enforcement
when construing similar fee-shifting provisions of SMCRA.

IV.

ELIGIBILITY FOR FEES

To become eligible for an award of attorney's fees under a feeshifting statute, a party must achieve some success on the merits.
This requirement was decreed by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.6 2 Ruckelshaus was decided as a result of an

58. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.546, 558-59 (1986)

[hereinafter Delaware Valley I] (allowing reimbursement for attorneys' fees for monitoring a consent
decree).
59. 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e).
60. H.R. Rm'. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AmN.
NEws 593, 626-27.
61. H.R. RP. No. 218, supra note 58, at 90, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN.
NEws at 627.
62. 463 U.S. 680 (1983) rev'g sub nom., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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appeal of the lower court decision in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch6 in
which plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees, even though they had
achieved no success on the merits in their litigation. 64 The lower
court reasoned that an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs was
appropriate in view of their contributions to the furtherance of the
goals of the Clean Air Act even though plaintiffs did not prevail
on the merits with regard to any aspect of the case.65
However, in Ruckelshaus the U. S. Supreme Court, divided five
to four, reversed Gorsuch and ruled that a provision of the Clean
Air Act identical to Section 520(d) of the SMCRA required at least
partial success on the merits of an action as a prerequisite for eligibility to receive an award of attorney's fees . The Court further
stated that awards of attorney's fees to parties having no success
on the merits would contravene traditional notions of fairness.67 The
Court concluded that the use of the phrase "whenever it (the court)
determines that such an award is appropriate" was meant by Congress to give courts and administrators discretion to award attorney's
fees to litigants who were partially successful on the merits, but not
those who achieved no success on the merits.6 8
The Ruckelshaus requirements have been extended to Section
525(e) of SMCRA by changes made in 43 CFR 1294(b) under which
525(e) is administered. Prior to Ruckelshaus, Section 1294(b) provided that attorney's fees might be awarded to any person making
a "substantial contribution to a full and fair determination of the
issues." ' 69 After Ruckelshaus, this section was amended to also require that a person seeking an award of attorney's fees under SMCRA
must achieve some success on the merits. 70
The requirement of some success on the merits was also discussed
in Hensley v. Eckerhart7 where attorneys sought to collect fees for
63. 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680
(1983).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gorsuch, 684 F.2d at 973.
Id. at 975.
Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682 n.l.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 689.
43 Fed. Reg. 34,399 (1978) (stating the wording of 43 C.F.R. 1294(b) prior to Ruckelshaus).
50 Fed. Reg. 47,224 (1985) (indicating the change in 43 C.F.R. 1294(b) after Ruckelshaus).
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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a partially successful constitutional challenge to treatment and conditions at a Missouri state hospital.2 In Hensley, decided about six
weeks prior to Ruckelshaus, the U.S. Supreme Court identified "the
degree of success" as the most critical factor and refused to allow
fees for hours expended on unsuccessful claims, unrelated to suc73
cessful claims.
Further, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
(Delaware Valley II),74 which involved the request for attorney's fees
by a citizens' group who successfully compelled the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania to comply with certain provisions of the Clean Air
Act, the U. S. Supreme Court indicated that under all "typical"
fee-shifting statutes, attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing
5
party only to the extent that party prevails.7
Thus, after Ruckelshaus, some success on the merits is necessary
to establish eligibility for an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs
under the SMCRA. However, the Ruckelshaus court indicated in a
footnote that "trivial success on the merits" and "purely procedural
victories" would not justify an award. 76 In addition, the Ruckelshaus
court urged that the differences in the ability to pay of private and
public defendants be taken into consideration when awarding costs
and that special care be taken in awarding fees against private parties.77
V.

ENTITLEMENT TO FEES

In keeping with the Ruckelshaus position that "trivial success"
does not satisfy the requirement of "some success on the merits,"
43 CFR § 4.1294(b), under which Section 525(e) is administered,
also requires more than some success on the merits. When Section
4.1294(b) was amended to add the Ruckelshaus requirement of "some
success on the merits", the original language of the regulation requiring that a party make a "substantial contribution to a full and
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 426-28.
Id.at 440.
483 U.S. 711 (1987) [hereinafter Delaware Valley II].
Id.at 713 n.1.
Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9.
Id.at 692 n.12.
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fair determination of the issues" to be entitled to statutory attorney's
fees was retained.78 Thus, as is indicated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement,79 a 1989 administrative hearing involving citizen group
intervention in the permitting process for a Colorado surface mine,
eligibility does not mean entitlement.8 0 Eligibility is attained by some
success on the merits, but entitlement which is also a prerequisite
for an award of attorney's fees requires more. There is substance
to the "substantial contribution" requirement, and attorneys representing clients who hope to collect fees from defendants under
SMCRA should evaluate the significance of the ends that will be
achieved should the clients prevail or partially prevail before pro81
ceeding with a case.
VI.

DETERMIMNG THE

BAsic

FEE (LODESTAR)

Once both eligibility and entitlement have been established, it is
then necessary for the court to determine the actual amount of the
fee to be awarded. Congress has indicated only that the fee-shifting
statutes should "result in fees adequate to attract competent counsel,
but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys. 8 2 To calculate
the baseline fee, the U. S. Supreme Court in Hensley, adopted a
formula using the attorney's reasonable hourly rate times the reasonable number of hours expended on the case. 83 The use of this
formula for obtaining what has come to be known as the "lodestar"
was affirmed by a unanimous court in Blum v. Stenson,8 4 involving
a class of Medicaid recipients represented by Legal Aid Society attorneys. 85
The apparent simplicity of the "lodestar" formula is deceptive.
Its application has been difficult and has required considerable ju78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

50 Fed. Reg. 47,224 (1985).
107 IBLA 339 (1989).
Id.at 368.
Id.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.

CODE CONG. & ADmIN.

NEWS 5908, 5913.

83. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983).
84. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
85. Id. at 888.
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dicial definition. First, under both Hensley and Ruckelshaus, a court
must decide 1) which claims were successful, 2) which unsuccessful
claims are related to successful claims, and 3) which unsuccessful
claims are totally unrelated to successful claims and, therefore, not
compensable. 86 In determining which claims are successful, the Court
in Hensley stated that the completeness of the relief granted is not
necessarily determinative of the degree of success.87
The determination of which claims fall into which category can
be a time-consuming task, especially if the judge hearing the fee
petition for attorney's fees is unfamiliar with the litigation for which
the fees are sought. He may have to conduct a painstaking review
of the case to determine which claims qualify for reimbursement.
During this review, a judge, whether administrative or judicial, must
rely on his own knowledge of the interrelationship of claims in a
proceeding to determine the linkage between successful claims and
related unsuccessful claims.
One way of conducting such a review was employed in National
Resources Defense Council v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement.88 In National Resources the administrative judge
analyzed which claims were compensable by dividing all claims into
the Hensley-Ruckelshaus categories: 1) successful, 2) unsuccessful
related and 3) unsuccessful unrelated. 9 After categorizing all claims,
the page-counting method was adopted to determine what percentage
of the total hours claimed by plaintiff's attorneys were compensable.
To implement the method, the plaintiff's brief was reviewed and
the number of pages devoted to successful or related claims was
determined. The percentage those pages constituted of the whole
brief was then applied to the total number of hours claimed to
determine how many hours were compensable.9° Pages devoted to

86. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694. It seems reasonable to read Hensley
and Ruckelshaus together because although they do not refer to each other, they were before the

United States Supreme Court at the same time and share a consistent view on the statutory shifting
of attorney's fees.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11.
107 IBLA 339 (1989).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 386.
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procedural matters were deducted from the total number of brief
pages before the percentage figure was determined. 9 1
An alternative method of calculating the number of hours devoted to successful or related claims was adopted in Utah Int'l, Inc.
v. Department of Interior 2 where a U.S. District Court surveyed
the attorneys' time sheets and determined how many hours were
devoted to the successful claims.9 3 It should be noted that the Utah
Int'l court expressly disallowed time spent by attorneys on 94public
relations activities, such as time spent informing the media.
A final method of determining compensable hours was adopted
by a U. S. District Court in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc.
v. Hodel (SOCM 1)95 where attorney's fees were sought by groups
who compelled enforcement of the provisions of SMCRA. 96 In SOCM
I, detailed time records were submitted to U. S. District Court.
Rather than scrutinizing the records to decide which hours should
be reimbursed, the court allowed opposing counsel to review the
application and make objections to any hours thought to be noncompensable9 The court then ruled on these objections.9 8 The SOCM
I method which entails placing the burden of determining which
hours are reasonable on the party who will have to pay the fees
seems to be the most efficient means of determining compensable
hours from a judicial standpoint. However, it is only useful when
detailed records are kept. Otherwise, a time-consuming review of
the litigation is necessary or the rather inexact page-counting method
must be used.
In order to insure that sufficiently detailed records are kept, a
Third Circuit Task Force on court-awarded attorney fees has recommended that a pretrial conference be held to reach an agreement

91. Id. at 388.

92. 643 F. Supp. 810 (D. Utah 1986).
93. Id. at 830-31.
94. Id. at 831 n.41.
95. 651 F. Supp. 1528 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd 857 F.2d
1516 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (en band) [hereinafter SOCM I].
96. Id. at 1531.
97. Id. at 1532.
98. Id.
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on how the records of an attorney's hours will be kept whenever
actions are brought under a statute which contains a fee-shifting
provision." Furthermore, contemporaneous record-keeping was recommended. °° This process requires that hourly records be submitted
to the court at regular intervals during litigation so that the court
can monitor the record-keeping. The Task Force recommended that
such records should be kept in camera.'01
Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins,02 where reimbursement for hours
expended by paralegals and law clerks was at issue, the U. S. Supreme Court indicated that costs and expenses usually billed to clients are compensable. 03 Such expenses may include the cost of
paralegals, telephone calls, and travel. The key to reimbursement
for these expenses is the practice of the community in which the
attorney's hourly rate is determined, since rates for attorneys will
reflect whether or not certain expenses are billed separately. °4 In
addition, it is clear from the plain language of Section 520(d) that
the fees of expert witnesses are compensable.105
VII.

THE REASONABLE

HouRLY

RATE

The second component of the lodestar determination is the hourly
rate. While there has been no consensus on the basis for the calculation, most courts have adopted the approach used by the Third

Circuit in Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. A. T. & T. Bell
Lab.'0 After surveying various methods of determining a reasonable
hourly rate, the court concluded that under Blum, the community
market rate was mandated. 0 7 The community market rate is the local
hourly rate of similar attorneys in private practice. Furthermore,
under Blum, it is the burden of the fee applicant to submit affidavits

99. TmaD Cmcurr TAsK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATroNmY FEEs 44 (1985).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 44.
Id. (In camera recordkeeping means that the records are not available to the public).
109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
Id. at 2465.
Id. at 2471.
30 U.S.C. § 1270(d).
842 F.2d 1436 (3rd Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1448. See also Blum, 465 U.S. at 895.
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to the court establishing the community market rate for his services.108

However, when the award of fees is against the United States
government, historical fees are required. A historical fee is the community market rate at the time the litigation actually occurred, rather
than the current rate.1 9 As the U. S. Supreme Court in Library of
0 explained, the government immunity from awards
Congress v. Shaw"1
of interest is not waived by congressional enactments like SMCRA
which waive the government's immunity from the collection of attorney's fees."' For the government to waive its immunity from
interest payments, specific statutory language waiving such immunity
is necessary. Absent such language, multipliers which compensate
for delay of payment as well as the use of current community market
rates to compensate for delay are considered interest and impermissible."12 However, in Missouri v. Jenkins,"3 the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear that awards which take into account a delay in
payment are permissible against a state.1 4 Presumably, such awards
would also be permissible against private litigants.
Another means of determining a reasonable hourly rate was set
forth in Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel (SOCM 11)115
which was an appeal of the fee award in SOCM L In SOCM I the
D.C. Circuit stated that an attorney's established hourly rate should
be presumed to be the reasonable hourly rate at which he should
be compensated under statutory fee-shifting provisions.1 6 Relying
on Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,"1 7 which was controlling precedent, the court reasoned that an attorney is in the best position to
know what his reasonable hourly rate should be and there is no
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11.
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).

114. Id. at 2469.
115. 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) [hereinafter
SOCM II].
116. Id. at 48.
117. 746 F.2d 4 (1984).
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reason to allow him a higher rate of compensation when the government is paying his fee." 8 The Circuit Court distinguished Blum,
where Legal Aid lawyers were compensated at the community rate
for private lawyers, because the Legal Aid lawyers in that case were
salaried and, therefore, had no set rates." 9
The reasoning of SOCM II and Laffey is attractive as the method
employed takes the burden of establishing a reasonable hourly rate
off the court whenever an attorney has established his own rates.
This holds true even if the attorney does not charge all of his clients
the same rate or if he takes most of his cases on a contingent basis.
However, the three judge panel which decided SOCM I did so
with misgivings. Even the author of the opinion admitted that Laffey, on which the SOCM II decision was based, might not be correct
on the issue of the established hourly rate. 20 In Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel (SOCM II),121 rehearing was granted
en banc. Laffey was vacated, and the prevailing community standard
was adopted for all attorneys whether practicing for profit, practicing in a public interest legal services organization or practicing
privately for profit, but at a reduced rate reflecting non-economic
goals, such as improving the environment or vindicating constitutional rights. 2 2 The SOCM III court reasoned that the difficulty of
determining the market rate, which was the rationale behind the
development of the Laffey method, does not prevent that rate from
being the proper basis for determining the reasonable hourly rate
for an attorney seeking an award of fees.1'2
Since the Laffey strain of cases has been vacated by the D.C.
Circuit, it would not seem necessary to discuss it. However, the
dissent in the SOCM III decision points out that the U. S. Supreme
Court has not yet spoken on this issue.IA In fact, the Court recently
118. SOCM H1, 826 F.2d at 48.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 49.
121. 857 F. 2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) [hereinafter SOCM III].
122. Id. at 1524.
123. Id. The court noted, however, that to conform with Shaw, the prevailing community rate
must be historical when the award is against the federal government. Id. at 1525.
124. Id. at 1534.
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declined an opportunity to resolve this issue by refusing to review
the Ninth Circuit decision in Maldonado v. Lehman'2 wherein the
-trial court determined the hourly billing rate of the prevailing party's
attorney by using the reasonable community standard. 126 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision against a challenge that
the Laffey method should have been used to ascertain the reasonable
hourly rate.127 In Webb v. Maldonado 28 the U. S. Supreme Court
29
declined to grant certiorarito the Ninth Circuit decision.1
Webb might have permanently resolved the question of how a
reasonable fee should be determined. In Webb, Justice White, who
authored Alyeska, Delaware Valley I and Delaware Valley II, strongly
dissented noting the difficulty the circuits have had in determining
what a "reasonable" attorney's fee is and the diversity of the methods utilized. 30 While the specific differences discussed by White have
been eliminated with the D.C. Circuit's vacating of Laffey, the practicality of the Laffey method, its ease of application and predictability of result, make it an attractive, though not perfect, solution
to the problem of determining a "reasonable" fee. This method has
been rejected by the circuits for the time being, but its use has not
been foreclosed by the U. S. Supreme Court.
VIII.

ENHANCEMENT

(Tim

MULTIPLiER)

Once the lodestar amount has been determined based on the
factors in the above section, the court may then consider whether
a "multiplier" should be used to adjust the fee upward or downward. 3 ' "Multiplier" is the term used to identify the mechanism by
which a fee is adjusted upward on downward for exceptional or
substandard representation. To evaluate whether or not a multiplier
should be used, the Hensley court indicated that the factors iden-

125. 811 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., Webb v. Maldonado, 484 U.S. 990

(1987).
126. Maldonado, 811 F.2d at 1342.
127. Id.
128. Webb, 484 U.S. at 990.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 990-91 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
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tified by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc. 132 should be used, but cautioned that some of the Johnson fac33
tors were included in the lodestar.
In Blum v. Stenson the U. S. Supreme Court specifically singled
out the 1) "novelty (and) complexity of the issues," 2) "experience
and special skill of the attorney," 3) "quality of representation,"
and 4) "results obtained" as factors already taken into consideration
in the initial lodestar determination. 34 In Delaware Valley I where
a citizens' group sought to recover attorney's fees expended in successful efforts to force the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to comply with the Clean Air Act, a majority of the U. S. Supreme Court
affirmed the inclusion in the lodestar of the four factors mentioned
in Blum. 135 Thus, a "strong presumption" exists that the lodestar
is a reasonable fee sufficient to satisfy the congressional purpose
behind the fee-shifting statutes.136 The Court concluded that the only
"multiplier" question left open was whether an upward adjustment
37
was warranted in cases where the risk of loss was great.'
This question of whether enhanced compensation was due attorneys seeking fees for work on exceptionally risky cases was held
over for argument, and a decision was rendered in Delaware Valley
IL In Delaware Valley II, a majority of the Court agreed that en3
hanced compensation was not warranted in this particular case. 1
The Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell and Scalia concluded
that the multiplier should never be used to compensate attorneys

132. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
133. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9. The Johnson factors are incorporated in Rule 1.5(a) of the

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a section which deals with the determination of a lawyer's
reasonable fee. The factors are: 1) The time and labor required; 2) The novelty and difficulty of the
questions; 3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 4) The preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) The customary fee; 6) Whether the

fee is fixed or contingent; 7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) The
amount involved and the results obtained; 9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;
10) The "undesirability" of the case; 11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with

the client; 12) Awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901.
Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 465 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Delaware V'alley II, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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for taking exceptionally risky cases. 139 However, they then waffled
by stating that even if the multiplier might be warranted in some
cases for risk, it should not have been used in this case. 14 The Court
reasoned that since the fees in question in this case were solely for
enforcing a consent decree, there was little risk involved.'14 Further,
the Court indicated that should an enhancement be required, it should
not exceed one-third of the lodestar. 142
Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the result, refused to join
that part of the opinion which would have cast considerable doubt
on, if not totally eliminated, the last application of the multiplier,
that is as an enhancement to compensate for risk. 143 She would allow
the use of a multiplier to enhance an award whenever the applicant
can prove that without enhancement, attracting competent counsel
would have involved substantial difficulty. 144 Her position appears
to be required by the congressional purpose behind the fee-shifting
provisions which is to allow fees sufficient for private citizens to
attract competent counsel. 45 However, in implementing the multiplier she would require courts to treat contingency cases as a class
governed by a community standard in the hope of bringing consistency to the determination of the amount of enhancement. 46 Four
other members of the court filed a separate dissent, but agreed with
Justice O'Connor that the multiplier might be used in certain in147
stances to enhance a fee.
Delaware Valley II seemed to send the clear message to the lower
courts that use of the multiplier will not be upheld by the Supreme
Court except in the most exceptional of circumstances, circumstances
of which even the Court is unable to formulate an example. However

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

725.
728.
729-30.
730.
734 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

144. Id. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
145. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 78.
146. Delaware Valley 1, 483 U.S. at 732-33, (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment).
147. Id. at 735 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in Ramos v. Lamm, 148 the Tenth Circuit suggested that a situation49
such as that which existed fictionally in To Kill a Mockingbird
might warrant an enhancement of the lodestar for risk.'50 In To Kill
a Mockingbird, an attorney in a small southern town in the 1930's
agrees to represent a Negro accused of raping a white girl. The
physical danger in which he placed himself and the emotional trauma
to which his family was subjected may have risen to the level of a
risk sufficient to warrant application of a multiplier.
Unfortunately for the quest for clarity in this area of the law,
the U. S. Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Bergeron' apparently
resurrected the Johnson factors and the multiplier when it indicated
that the "Johnson factors may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar
amount .... 1152 Justice Scalia, while concurring in the judgment,
voiced dismay at the resurrection of Johnson and launched a stinging
attack on the use of legislative history by the courts.' Thus, because
of Blanchard it is difficult to know the status of the multiplier, but
important to remember that while the Court has refused to bury it,
the Court has never upheld an award based on its use.
IX.

AwARDs RELATIVE TO THE FEE ACTION

In Utah Int'l the U. S. District Court indicated that hours claimed
for work on fee petitions should be reimbursable, but only for time
54
spent in preparing the fee application related to compensable claims.
In addition, the award should be reduced based on the percentage
of success obtained on the fee petition.' 5
However, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in North Carolina
Dept. of Transportationv. Crest St. Council, Inc.'5 6 involving a Title
VI challenge to the routing of an expressway through a predomi-

148. 713 F.2d 546 (1983).
149. H. LEE, To KIL A MocKInGBDnU (1960).

150. Id.at 558.
151. 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989).
152. Id.at 945.
153. Id.at 946-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
154. Utah Int'l, 643 F. Supp. at 831.
155. Id.
156. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
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nately black neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina, indicates
that the action for attorney's fees must be brought as part of the
statutory enforcement action. 157 The action for attorney's fees in
Crest St. was brought under the Civil Right Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976158 in a separate proceeding commenced after the civil
rights claims had been settled. 5 9 The Court indicated that where the
statutory provision for an award of attorney's fees provides that
"in the action or proceeding to enforce ....

(the statute) ....

the

court may award attorney's fees", the fee action must be a part of
the action to enforce. 6° The fee-shifting provisions of SMCRA do
not track precisely the language of the fee-shifting provision in Crest
St. However, the provision under consideration in Crest St. was also
the provision under consideration in Hensley and Blum, cases widely
used in interpreting myriad statutory fee-shifting provisions including the SMCRA provisions. In addition, Crest St. was the case chosen by the Court to resolve a Circuit conflict about the allowability
61
of separate actions to recover statutorily-provided attorney's fees.1
Thus, Crest St. should be considered when recovery of fees is contemplated under the SMCRA, at least until the Court clearly defines
the scope of Crest St.
In addition, the U. S. Supreme Court considered what proceedings are covered by the fee-shifting provision of a statute. In Webb
v. Dyer County Board of Education, 62 which involved a challenge
to the job termination of a school teacher, the Court disallowed
claims for work done on a state administrative hearing which preceded the judicial litigation. The Court reasoned that since a clear
line could be drawn between the work on the two actions and since
the federal statute under which the fees were claimed did not require
the administrative hearing, reimbursement could not be obtained
63
under Hensley as reasonable preparation.

157. Id. at 12.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1983).

159. Crest St., 479 U.S. at 11.
160. Id. at 16.

161. Id. at 11.
162. 471 U.S. 234 (1985).
163. Id. at 238.
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Further, in Crest St., the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that
under statutory fee-shifting provisions whose language specifies an
"action or proceeding to enforce,"' 164 a resolution through judicial
6
litigation is required to be eligible for recovery of attorney's fees.1 1
The history of the interpretation of statutory fee-shifting provisions
detailed in this note indicates the broad applicability of court decisions to similar provisions. However, thus far Crest St. has not
been applied in environmental litigation, and it is difficult to predict
if its future application will remain narrow or be expanded by the
Court.
X.

CONCLUSION

While it has been argued that the requirement of "some success
on the merits" and "substantial contribution" will have a chilling
effect on environmental litigation, it is not clear that some evaluation
of claims prior to the commencement of litigation is not desirable.
It is important to remember that attorneys, not private citizens, evaluate claims prior to taking legal action, and this is no different than
that which attorneys are asked to do everyday-assess for each client
his likelihood of succeeding. An experienced environmental lawyer
should be able to make this evaluation with some accuracy and
should be prepared to accept responsibility for his assessment of a
case. Neither the government, nor private defendants should be expected to pay for his misevaluation.
The purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to ensure that every
person can obtain competent counsel, but that is not to say that
every attorney taking a case under a fee-shifting statute should be
reimbursed. The congressional intent does not seem to have been
to provide fee insurance for the bar. In addition, it is becoming
apparent that not every path to resolution will result in compensation.
However, as has been noted in the body of this note, judges
have considerable discretion in determining which claims qualify for

164. Crest St., 479 U.S. at 12.
165. Id. at 14.
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reimbursement to assure that justice is served. Therefore, it would
seem, at least in theory, that all claims having merit would be reimbursable under the partially prevailing party standard.
As long as some success is required for reimbursement, it is not
likely that the fee-shifting sections of the SMCRA will have widespread repercussions for the coal industry. Most litigation conducted
under 520(d) and 525(e) has involved the government as the defendant with private parties as interveners. Therefore, the fees have
been assessed against the government rather than private businesses.
Thus, it would seem that as long as individual coal companies
maintain compliance with current statutes, any litigation is likely to
involve suits by citizens' groups against the government to compel
enforcement of the statutory provisions and to bring about changes
in the regulations governing administration of the statutes. Of course,
coal companies who violate the provisions of the SMCRA risk prosecution and liability for the attorneys' fees of opponents. Such coal
companies also risk the assessment of their opponents' attorney's
fees as damages under Section 520(f) of the SMCRA.
However, even in actions by private groups to change government regulations affecting the coal industry, it is to be expected that
considerable expenditures will be necessary to legally influence the
outcome of the action. In this situation, it can be argued that if
the fee-shifting provisions of the SMCRA make it easier for private
individuals to assert claims for regulatory changes, the coal industry
faces the increased legal costs of insuring representation of its interests.

E. Ann Compton Keel
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